A Different Democracy: American Government in a 31-Country by Steven L. Taylor, Matthew S. Shugart, Arend Lijphart,
By Steven L. Taylor, Matthew S. Shugart, Arend Lijphart, Bernard Grofman
4 amazing students in political technology study American democracy from a comparative standpoint, exploring how the U.S. political method differs from that of thirty different democracies and what these transformations finally suggest for democratic functionality. This crucial textual content ways the subsequent associations from a political engineering viewpoint: constitutions, electoral platforms, and political events, in addition to legislative, govt, and judicial strength. The textual content seems to be at democracies from worldwide over a two-decade timeframe. the result's not just a clean view of the much-discussed subject matter of yank exceptionalism but additionally an leading edge method of comparative politics that treats the USA as yet one case between many. an amazing textbook for either American and comparative politics classes.
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Additional resources for A Different Democracy: American Government in a 31-Country Perspective
2). In some applications, modeling elections explicitly is important. 2). Three approaches to modeling elections are currently popular. These differ on two main dimensions. First, models differ on whether candidates and parties can credibly commit to particular policies before elections. Second, assuming that commitments are not credible, models differ on whether elections are conceived as a selection device or as a mechanism to discipline incumbents. 1 Policy Precommitment Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) developed one of the ﬁrst formal models of electoral competition.
P1: SBT 0521872294c02 CUNY764/Treisman 0 521 87229 4 Printer: cupusbw June 7, 2007 20:6 Modeling Politics full before each election – a candidate who admitted she would consume rents would always lose to an otherwise identical rival who promised not to. This meant the model could not be used to analyze situations in which ofﬁcials do consume rents. Second, the assumption of only two parties or candidates begged the question of how citizens decide whether or not to run for ofﬁce. This was a key focus of a subsequent wave of models.
Such private gains may be legal – an ofﬁcial salary – or illegal – funds corruptly embezzled. I denote such (after-tax) consumption of the budget by ofﬁcials as c. Others assume that ofﬁcials are entirely benevolent, maximizing the well-being of the citizens they govern. Although I will sometimes adopt one of these extreme positions – for instance, to evaluate arguments that themselves make these assumptions – I will more generally suppose that government ofﬁcials are partially benevolent and partially 17 18 30 See, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.